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Abstract
This article discusses the role of  Catholics, Muslims, and civic associations 
in the global politics of  the Philippines and Indonesia. The two countries 
have shared in common with regard to the geographical feature (both are 
archipelagic countries), the diversity of  societies and cultures, and the history 
of  colonialism, dictatorship, ethno-religious violence, and political movement, 
to name but a few. In addition to their similarities, both countries also have 
significant‍ differences‍ in‍ particular‍ pertaining‍ to‍ religious‍ dominance‍ (the‍
Philippines dominated by Catholicism, while Indonesia by Islam) and the 
structure‍of ‍their‍societies:‍while‍the‍Philippines‍is‍a‍class-stratified‍society,‍
Indonesia has long been ideologized by colonial and post-colonial religious and 
political powers. Apart from their parallels and distinctions, religion—both 
Catholicism and Islam—has marvellous role, negatively or positively, in global 
politics and public cultures, indicating its vigor and survival in global political 
domains.‍This‍comparative‍paper,‍more‍specifically,‍examines‍the‍historical‍
dynamics of  the interplay between religion, civil society, and political activism 
by using the Philippines and Indonesia as a case study and point of  analysis.
1 I wish to express my deepest thanks to Robert W. Hefner for his guidance and 
mentorship during my uneasy doctoral study at Boston University, in which the draft 
of  this article was composed, and secondly to R. Scott Appleby at the University of  
Notre Dame for providing a research fellowship at the Kroc Institute for International 
Peace Studies, which enable me to develop and finish this piece. 
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[Artikel ini mendiskusikan peran Katolik, Muslim dan asosiasi warga dalam 
politik global di dua negara; Indonesia dan Filipina. Kedua negara tersebut 
memiliki‍kesamaan,‍baik‍dalam‍hal‍ciri‍geografis‍sebagai‍negara‍kepulauan,‍
keragaman masyarakat dan budayanya, sejarah kolonialisme, pemerintahan 
diktator, kekerasan etnik-agama, serta gerakan keagamaan. Terlepas dari 
kesamaan tersebut, keduanya memiliki perbedaan, utamanya menyangkut 
agama dominan (di Filipina didominasi oleh Katolik, sementara di Indonesia 
oleh‍Islam)‍dan‍struktur‍masyarakatnya‍(Filipina‍ditandai‍dengan‍stratifikasi‍
masyarakat berdasarkan klas sosial, sementara di Indonesia ditandai dengan 
ideologi agama kolonial, paska-kolonial, politik). Terlepas dari kesamaan dan 
perbedaan antara keduanya, agama -baik Katolik maupun Islam- memainkan 
peran penting, baik negatif  maupun positif, dalam politik global dan budaya 
publik. Ini menandai kuatnya peran agama di kedua negara itu. Artikel ini 
menggunakan analisis perbandingan, utamanya terhadap dinamika sejarah 
hubungan‍antara‍agama,‍masyarakat‍sipil,‍dan‍aktifisme‍politik.]‍
Keywords: Catholicism, Islam, civil society, the Philippines, Indonesia 
A. Introduction
In the 2009 roundtable discussion held by Boston University’s 
Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, Peter L. Berger (b. 
1929), the founder of  the Institute and one of  the world’s prominent 
sociologists of  religion, told the audience that he once saw a car with a 
pamphlet mentioning “Nietzsche is dead!”. What the writer meant was 
certainly not the death of  the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche 
since he passed away in 1900, but the demise of  his idea that claimed 
the “death of  God,” 2 Berger mentioned. Recalling Nietzsche’s audacious 
slogan, Time Magazine starkly printed “Is God Dead?” on its cover of  8 
April 1966 edition by which the magazine addressed the growing atheism 
among Americans at the time. Two years later, through New York Times, 
Berger also predicted the sinking of  religious influence, which later he 
2 This phrase first appeared in The Gay Science (Section 108). It is also found 
in Nietzsche’s philosophical novel Thus Spake Zarathustra (German: Also Sprach 
Zarathustra), transl. Alexander Tille (New York and London: Macmillan, 1896). 
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admitted as erroneous.3 
Since the emergence of  secularisation that predicted the 
marginalization –if  not to mention the end- of  religion as logical 
consequence of  modernity, many scholars, scientists and theologians 
had sided with the wave of  secularisation thesis. Berger was among 
Western social scientists who previously keenly cheered the prediction 
of  the end of  religion in 21st century; that is losing its influence and 
role in politics, economics, and cultures. Responding to this trend, Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart in 2004 aptly wrote: “the death of  religion 
was the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of  the 
twentieth century.”4  
As a result of  these thesis and theories of  modernization in general, 
debates among social scientists over the role of  faith in politics and 
public cultures had inclined to be dominated by anti-religion specialists. 
However, it is recently that religion comes to appear in the academia 
and scholarly forums, directing the secularisation thesis to the other 
way around. The acknowledgement over the role of  religion and its 
contribution to modern public cultures and politics began to come into a 
view when Western academic circles, particularly in the 1990s, notified to 
the so-called “the resurgent of  religion”5 or, in the phrase of  Georgetown 
sociologist, Jose Casanova, the coming of  “public religion.”6 In other 
words, Berger mentioned as the “de-secularisation of  the world”7 and 
the corrosion of  secularisation theories.  
However, the above pessimistic views toward the role of  religion 
in public domains are highly influence by the Western context where 
religion had long become a source of  calamity, bloodshed, despotism, and 
undemocratic political power. Muslim societies, by contrast, historically 
3 Peter Berger, “A Bleak Outlook Is Seen for Religion,” New York Times, February 
25 (1968), p. 3. 
4 Pippa Norris dan Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular : Religion and Politics 
Worldwide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3.
5 See for example, Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel 
Shah, God’s‍Century:‍Resurgent‍Religion‍and‍Global‍Politics (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2011).
6 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of  
Chicago Press, 1994). 
7 Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of  the World: Resurgent Religion and World 
Politics (Washington, D.C.: Eerdmans/Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999). 
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had no experience of  a large-scale intra-religious violence such as the 
European wars of  religion, a series of  wars waged in Europe from 
ca. 1524 to 1697 following the onset of  the Protestant Reformation 
in Western and Northern Europe. It is then understandable why the 
idea of  religious freedom as well as of  “religious bitterness” is not so 
strong in the Muslim world. On the contrary, by the Western supporters 
of  secularisation theories, religion was portrayed, more or less, as the 
“burning motivation, the one that inspired fanatical devotion and the 
most vicious hatred” in the wars that plagued Europe in the 16th and 
17th centuries. As a result, despite the fact that billions of  people 
structure their daily routines around the spiritual practices enjoined by 
a religious tradition, the backers of  secularisation theories, in the words 
of  prominent historian of  religion Scott Appleby tend to “overlook or 
underestimate the complex, multiple roles and functions of  religion in 
societies populated by believers who reserve final obedience to a sovereign 
deity or by adherents of  a spiritual order.”8 
Another objection to those who would increase the role of  religion 
in public affairs, including the creation of  public cultures of  civility, 
common good, democracy, and peacemaking, as Scott Appleby has 
rightly pointed out, is the “persistence of  religiously motivated conflict, 
intolerance, and anti-pluralist movements among some social groupings 
operating apart from (and sometimes in rebellion against) the state and 
government.” In brief, “relocating religion’s public expressions to the 
nongovernmental domain of  civil society,” Appleby continued to argue, 
“did not remove the problem of  religious violence, albeit fighting [“on 
behalf  of  God”] has been more ubiquitous in societies lacking strong 
civic institutions and social tradition of  pluralism and tolerance.”9 In 
recent decades, violent conflicts and extremism in various part of  the 
world, from Northern Ireland, the Philippines, the Balkans, Sudan, Iran, 
Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, to Indonesia, to name but a 
few, has been cloaked, in whole or in part, in religious dress. 
Without a doubt, the dreadful record of  religiously inspired 
radicalism and repression makes a more complicated picture of  religious 
8 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of  the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 2-3. 
9 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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agency. On one hand, religion in some countries did contribute to the 
creation of  intolerance and tyranny, and the initiation and escalation of  
communal strife. On the other hand, it played a great role in nonviolent 
movements, democratic civilian protests, and peace building processes 
in societies undergoing social discords as in the case of  the Philippines, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and many others. Moreover, religion also 
contributed to the creation of  democratic state and egalitarian political 
system. Unfortunately, religious teachings not only preach tolerance and 
advocate forgiveness and mercy in the face of  opposition. The idea of  
killing, bigotry, and fanaticism is also abhorrent to all religious traditions. 
Despite the overwhelming peacefulness of  every religious tradition, 
however, the fact remains that they are also filled with the symbols and 
language of  violence.10 While some religious leaders use (or misuse) 
religious teachings and normative discourses to support their violent acts, 
radicalism, and tyranny, others utilize and “exploit” religion to sustain 
their nonviolent, peaceful, democratic, and pluralist movements. 
Scott Appleby classifies religion used for supporting violence as 
a “weak religion,” in contrast to a “strong religion” which promotes 
conciliation, equality, pluralism, and other human’s universal values. 
Religion becomes “weak,” where it as an independent cultural and social 
presence has been weakened by oppression, a history of  subordination to 
hostility, or by losing the struggle with the forces of  modernization. When 
religion becomes “weak,” it is easy to use it as a vehicle of  conflict and 
violence.11 This is precisely what happened, for instance, in Maluku. In this 
archipelagic province, where communal violence between Muslims and 
Christians steadily fought each other for more than four years from 1999 
to 2004, the weakening processes of  Christianity and Islam by political 
power began since the time of  Islamic sultanates (i.e. Tidore, Ternate, 
Bacan, and Jailolo in the northern part of  Maluku) and European and 
Japanese colonialism until the New Order dictatorial regime.12 
10 See for instance Mark Juergensmeyer and Margo Kitts (eds.), Princeton Readings 
in Religion and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); R. Scott Appleby 
(ed.), Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of  the Middle East (Chicago, IL: The 
University of  Chicago Press, 1997).
11 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence, pp. 77-8. 
12 I have discussed this issue in my dissertation titled “Interreligious Violence, 
Civic Peace, and Citizenship: Christians and Muslims in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia, 
Sumanto Al Qurtuby
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2012 M/1434 H396
As the outcome of  inconsistencies and incoherence within 
secularisation theory itself  and as a result of  the growth of  “religious 
resurgence” and “public religion,” the classical variant of  secularisation 
theory has been subjected to extensive criticism. The sociologist Peter 
Berger once said that believing in the secularisation thesis as a “big 
mistake,” albeit he previously supported the theory.13 It is certainly 
a “big mistake” in part because such a theory, when it first emerged, 
did not count facts of  non-Western societies. In many societies, dress, 
eating habits, gender relations, democratic protests, popular movements, 
collective violence, conflict resolution, and peace building—all unfold 
beneath a so-called a “sacred canopy.” Around much of  the world, 
politics and civil society are also suffused with religion. The case of  
the Philippines and Indonesia discussed in this article also proved the 
significance of  religion in a public domain. The collective conflict, 
democratic movements, and peace building processes took place on the 
ground in the two archipelagic nations were concealed in religious garb. 
Hence, “if  the core of  the secularisation thesis remains intact,” Scott 
Appleby has remarked, “its corollaries require revision.”14 
The secularisation thesis undeniably needs to be revised since it has 
proven a poor guide to global historical reality. In God’s‍Century:‍Resurgent‍
Religion‍and‍Global‍Politics, Monica Toff, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy 
Shah correctly state that “over the past four decades, religion’s influence 
on politics has reversed its decline and become more powerful on every 
continent and across every major world religion….religion has come to 
exert its influence in parliaments, presidential palaces, lobbyists’ offices, 
campaigns, militant training camps, negotiation rooms, protest rallies, city 
squares, and dissident jail cells… Once private, religion has gone public. 
Once passive, religion is now assertive and engaged. Once local, it is now 
global. Once subservient to the powers that be, religion has often become 
‘prophetic’ and resistant to politicians at every level.”15 This article, in 
some part, is an effort to criticize the mainstream variant of  secularisation 
theory and demonstrate the continuing vitality of  religious traditions and 
Boston University, Department of  Anthropology, 2012. 
13 Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of  the World. 
14 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence, p. 4. 
15 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s‍Century, 
pp. 2-3.
Catholics, Muslims, and Global Politics in Southeast Asia
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2012 M/1434 H 397
institutions in the modern world. It provides another compelling evidence 
of  “religious resurgence” in global politics, especially in Southeast Asian 
archipelagos of  the Philippines and Indonesia. 
B. The Philippines: Catholics and Political Movement
Off  all Southeast Asian countries, Republic of  the Philippines 
(Filipino: Republika ng Pilipinas), the world’s 12th most populous country 
with some 92 million populations and one of  the richest areas of  
biodiversity in the planet, has provided a unique feature with regard to the 
issues of  ethno-religious identity, history of  colonialism, and experiences 
of  democracy. This predominantly Roman Catholic archipelagic state, for 
instance, had been the only country in Southeast Asia that experienced 
the longest colonialism of  Spain and later the United States after this 
country defeated Spaniards in the four months of  wars in 1898, as 
an outcome of  American intervention in the ongoing Cuban War of  
Independence against Spanish rule.16 Aside from the brief  period of  
Japanese occupation, the United States retained sovereignty over the 
archipelago until the end of  World War II when the Philippines gained 
independence. Since then, the Philippines has faced a number of  serious 
challenges, including Muslim resistance in Mindanao and sporadic cases of  
communist insurgency. In addition, the nation has had often tumultuous 
experiences with democracy and citizenship, and with popular people 
power movements overthrowing a dictatorship in one instance but also 
underlining the institutional weaknesses of  its constitutional republics 
in others. 
It is commonly known that colonialism had always profound effects 
to the formation of  politics, religiosity, cultures, systems/structures, 
16 Prior to the Spanish colonization, Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan 
arrived in the Philippines in 1521 and claimed the islands of  Spain. Colonization began, 
however, when Spanish explorer Miguel Lopez de Legaspi arrived from Mexico in 1565 
and formed the first European settlements in Cebu. In 1571, the Spaniards established 
Manila as the capital of  the Spanish East Indies. By the turn of  the 19th century, as 
a result of  the Spanish-American War, the United States defeated the Spaniards and 
began to colonize the Philippines. On the history of  the Philippines, see for instance, 
Onorfre Corpuz, The Roots of  the Filipino Nation (Honolulu: University of  Hawai’i Press, 
2007); Luis Francia, History‍of ‍the‍Philippines:‍From‍Indios‍Bravos‍to‍Filipinos (New York: The 
Overlook Press, 2010); Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).
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and divisions of  colonized societies. Like elsewhere in the world, as an 
outcome of  the colonization, particularly since the mid-19th century, 
the Philippine peoples (i.e. Filipinos) have been the most severely class-
stratified in Southeast Asia. Such class-based stratification was mostly the 
product of  the “Spanish creation” of  social class within the Philippine 
societies. European immigration to the Philippines, for instance, 
created a new class of  Criollos and Mestizos. The Criollos or Creole 
peoples were a social class in the caste system of  the overseas colonies 
established by the Spain in the 16th century not only in the Philippines 
but also in Latin America, comprising the locally-born people of  pure 
or mostly Spanish ancestry. In the Philippines, the Criollos referred to 
the archipelago-born Spaniards. The Mestizos, moreover, referred to 
Filipinos of  mixed ingenious Malayan, European, or Chinese ancestry. 
This term is traditionally used in Spain or Latin America for people 
of  mixed heritage or decent. When Spaniards opened the country’s 
harbors to world trade in the mid-19th century, the economy increased; 
consequently many Criollos and Mestizos became new wealthy family, 
well-established society, and respected business class that later had been 
one of  the major players in the country’s post-independence politics.17 
Despite its massive impacts on local societies, the Spanish 
colonialism actually only reached the northern regions of  the Philippines, 
which are dominated by Roman Catholics. In other words, although 
Spanish colonizers had consolidated their hold on the northern tier of  
the country by 1600, they never accomplished the complete subjugation 
of  the Muslim south. Accordingly, Muslims, comprising some 5% of  the 
country’s total population and are geographically concentrated in the 
southwest Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, are distinguished from 
Christian Filipinos in the north not only by their profession of  Islam 
but also by their evasion of  three hundred years of  Spanish colonial 
domination.18 Against this backdrop, it is therefore doubtful when 
Mindanao’s Muslim leaders such as Hasyim Salamat (d. 2003) of  the 
17 Onorfre Corpuz, The Roots of  the Filipino; Luis Francia, History‍of ‍the‍Philippines. 
18 The historian Anthony Reid said that Islam appears to have first reached 
the Sulu archipelago in the late 14th century by way of  the extensive trade networks 
of  the Malay, with a Muslim sultanate becoming established in Sulu by about 1450. 
See Anthony Reid, Southeast‍Asia‍in‍the‍Age‍of ‍Commerce,‍1450-1680 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995). 
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Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Aburajak Janjalani (d. 1998) of  
Abu Sayyaf  Group (ASG), or Nur Misuari, founder of  Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), claimed that the Moro conflicts, which since 
the beginning of  the 1970s resulted in some 50,000 to more than 120,000 
casualties, are only the most recent phase of  a continuous struggle that 
dated back in 1521 when, to quote Salamat’s claims, “Spain invaded 
Bangsamoro homeland.” For this reason, Hashim Salamat described the 
Bangsamoro struggle for freedom and self-determination as “the longest 
and bloodiest in the entire history of  mankind.”19 
These “Islamic sentiments” expressed by some leaders of  Moro 
Muslims do not necessarily represent a statement of  historical fact of  the 
Bangsamoro grievances during the Spanish and American colonialism, 
but merely a sort of  “invention of  (new) tradition” in the service of, to 
borrow Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, an “imagined community.”20 
To be sure, the “modern myth of  Morohood,” namely the idea that a 
single, transcendent identity was forged among the Philippine Muslims, 
particularly Moro Muslims, in the course of  a “four-century old history 
of  Christian-Muslim bitterness” finds far-reaching support among 
scholars of  the Southern Philippines. Such an idea has also been widely 
cheered by the partisans of  Bangsamoro cause, and strongly resonates 
with “primordial’s notion” of, in the words of  Samuel Huntington, 
innately “civilizational fault lines.”21 Challenging the view that Muslim 
Filipinos or ‘Moro’ identity was forged over three or four centuries of  
resistance against Spanish and later American colonial invasions in the 
archipelago, anthropologist Thomas McKenna22 chronicles the more 
recent appearance of  a shared ‘Moro’ identity and aspirations for the 
nation-statehood in the twentieth century, especially from the late 1960s 
19 Kit Collier, “Dynamics of  Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” in Damien 
Kingsbury (ed.), Violence‍ in‍Between:‍Conflict‍ and‍ Security‍ in‍Archipelagic‍ Southeast‍Asia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 156-71. See also in Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “In Search of  
Socio-Historical Roots of  Southeast Asia’s Islamist Terrorism,” Journal of  Indonesian 
Islam Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, pp. 205-239. 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined‍Communities:‍Reflections‍on‍the‍Origin‍and‍Spread‍of ‍
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 2003). 
21 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of  Civilization?,” Foreign Affairs 72 (3), 
1993, pp. 22-49. 
22 Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed 
Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1998). 
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onwards when the desire for the creation of  an autonomous region of  
the Southern Philippines began to unfold among the Moro-Muslim 
intellectual-activists. Since this paper puts emphasis on Catholic groups 
in the northern areas of  the nation, I will not discuss this issue further, 
albeit the Moro case also indicates the appearance of  religion (i.e. Islam) 
in global politics and public domains pertinent to this study. However, it 
is sufficient to say that the modern ethno-religious political movement 
for Muslim separatism in the country can be traced back in the late 1960s 
when a small set of  Philippine Muslim students and intellectuals began to 
organize the political movement. It gained a popular support and public 
sympathy among Moro Muslims after the 1970 eruption of  sectarian 
violence in Kotabato, and emerged as a separatist front in response to 
the declaration of  Martial Law by President Marcos in 1972.23 
Despite issues of  religious violence, Islamist radicalism, and 
separatist movement in the southern areas of  the archipelago which 
recently ended with a peace treaty, the Philippines, aside from Indonesia 
where in 1998 an alliance of  Muslims and non-Muslims had successfully 
toppled Suharto’s New Order dictatorial regime,24 has provided Southeast 
Asia’s first and foremost remarkable examples of  mass mobilization 
and massive civilian protests in favor of  liberal democracy and “good 
governance” by religious and secular forces which are commonly typified 
with “civil society.”25 Since the Philippines gained its independence in 
23 Since that year and lasting in 1976, the “Muslim rebels” -under the banner of  
the MNLF- were involved in bitter wars against the Philippine authorities. Under the 
auspices of  the Organization of  Islamic Conference and President Muammar Qaddafi 
of  Libya, the Marcos rule held negotiations with the MNLF reaching a treaty known 
the “Tripoli Agreement” in 1976. The pact contains, among other, an agreement in 
which each group would stop fighting and the southern Philippines would be granted 
as an autonomous Muslim region. Unfortunately, the Marcos regime never honored 
the accord, consequently the resistance reemerged in the following years. See Damien 
Kingsbury (ed.), Violence‍ in‍Between:‍Conflict‍ and‍ Security‍ in‍Archipelagic‍ Southeast‍Asia‍
(Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 
2005), pp. 44-5. 
24 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
25 On the literature and debate on the concepts of  civil society can be read at, 
among others, John Hall (ed.) Civil‍Society:‍Theory,‍History,‍Comparison (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995); Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (eds.), Civil Society: Challenging Western 
Models (London: Routledge, 1996); Robert P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and 
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1946, this archipelagic state, comprising some 7,107 islands, underwent at 
least four times of  the immense mass mobilization and “people power” 
led by Catholic and secular leaders to protest the country’s corrupt and 
dictatorial regimes. Specifically, this massive mobilization was divided 
into two major categories: the election-watch campaigns (in 1953, 1969, 
and 1986) and the 2001 People Power movement.  
I will specifically examine these movements aiming at comprehending 
the significant contributions of  Catholic leaders, churches, and 
institutions, along with non-Catholic elements, in the global politics 
of  the Philippines. The first vast mass mobilization and huge marches 
took place in 1953, when a coalition of  religious and secular forces: 
Catholic churches, business communities, and veterans’ leagues created 
the National Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL), Asia’s earliest 
and well-known election-watch campaigns. Responding to allegation of  
money politics (“vote buying”) committed by local bosses and politicians 
linked to certain political parties, especially those affiliated to the ruling 
party (i.e. the Liberal Party), the NAMFREL fielded huge volunteers in 
election zones around the archipelago. The successful movement helped 
to thwart and report electoral fraud and violence carried out in the name 
of  Elipidio Quirino (r. 1948-1953), former senator, lawyer, and incumbent 
president, and thereby paved the way for the election of  the avowedly 
reformist politician from Nacionalista Party Ramon Magsaysay (d. 1957), 
ex-guerrilla leader during the Pacific War and former military governor 
of  Zambales, to the presidency.  
The second religious and civil society-based mobilization occurred 
in 1969, when the Citizens National Electoral Assembly (CNEA) 
mounted an election-monitoring effort aiming to prevent massive vote 
buying, electoral manipulation, and violence across the archipelago during 
the national election. Unfortunately, however, the CNEA movement 
failed to create enough momentum; as a result the dictatorial regime 
Ferdinand Marcos (d. 1989), whose reign from 1965 to 1986 was marked 
by massive authoritative government corruption, despotism, nepotism, 
political repression, and human rights violation, was successfully re-
elected to be the country’s president. Nearing the end of  his second 
term and constitutionally barred from seeking a third, President Marcos 
Culture in China and Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).
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in September, 1972, declared a martial law, an imposition of  military rule 
by military authorities, by using the country’s political divisions, extensive 
riots, the Cold War tension, and the specter of  communist rebellion and 
Islamist insurgency in the Moro region as its political justifications. In 
1986, spurred by accumulation of  crises, fraud, corruption, violence, 
and dictatorship during the 20-year-old Marcos regime, once again 
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL) dispatched 
hundreds of  thousands, if  not millions, of  Philippine peoples to demand 
his resignation. This enormous display of  the “People Power drama” 
compelled Marcos into exile and brought the popular candidate Corazon 
Aquino (widely known Cory Aquino, 1933-2009) into the Philippine 
presidency. 
This 1986 movement was the third massive mobilization and 
civilian protest in the history of  post-independence Philippine politics 
involving, among others, Catholic Churches and business class. Cory 
Aquino (r. 1986-1992), Asia’s first female president, gained her fame after 
the assassination of  his husband Benigno Aquino, Jr. Although she had no 
previous political experience, after the death of  her husband, she became 
a new symbol of  political opposition and unifying force of  the movement 
against Marcos who proclaimed the 1986 election victory, despite 
widespread electoral fraud. After the elections were held on February 7, 
1986, and the National Assembly (i.e. Batasang Pambansa) proclaimed 
Marcos the winner in the elections, Cory Aquino called for massive civil 
disobedience protests, declaring herself  as having been cheated and as the 
real winner in the presidential elections. Filipinos enthusiastically heeded 
her call and rallied behind her. Aquino was finally installed as the 11st 
president of  the Philippines by the relatively peaceful 1986 People Power 
Revolution (also known the ESDA Revolution) under the leadership of  
Aquino with the banner of  NAMFREL. 
Once again, by the turn of  the twentieth century, the massive 
mobilization and gigantic marches recurred in the archipelago. In 2001, an 
enormous wave of  people power composed of  very broad-based religious 
institutions, civic associations, and nongovernmental organizations 
ranging from human rights, labor, women, and veteran activist groups 
to corporate executives and white-collar workers, Catholic clergy, and 
college students rallied on the country’s streets protested against the graft, 
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corruption, and other abuses of  power committed by President Joseph 
Estrada (r. 1998-2001). Known as the EDSA Revolution of  2001 or 
EDSA II (i.e. the Second People Power Revolution), this four-day popular 
movement or “street parliamentarians,” again, successfully overthrew the 
“drunken master” President Joseph Estrada and led Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (b. 1947) to the Malacanang Palace as the 14th president of  the 
country. Thus, more than any other country in Southeast Asia, vast mass 
mobilization by an alliance of  religious leaders and various civil society 
elements in opposition to authoritarianism and in support of  liberal 
democracy remains a powerful, influential, and lasting force in the political 
life and sphere of  the Philippines. 
The four episodes of  mass mobilization and civilian protests (three 
election-watch campaigns and one People Power movement) in the 
Philippine history and politics described above provide classic examples 
of  what the Tocquevillean literature on transitions from authoritarianism 
has referred to, in the words of  Eva-Lotta Hedman, as “resurrected civil 
society, fighting the good fight on behalf  of  democracy.”26 Although 
those political movements had fruitfully deposed three corrupt presidents 
(Quirino, Marcos, and Estrada), Hedman however does not recognize 
the movements as the country’s achievement of  religious-secular or 
civil society coalition, partly because the “driving forces” of  the three 
election-watch campaigns and the 2001 People Power were constant, 
and the mobilization was only to serve the interests of  the “power bloc” 
of  the country consisting of  three major elements: the United States 
(including agencies of  the U.S. government and a set of  associations 
and ‘intellectuals’ nestled within the U.S.-led transnational bloc), Catholic 
Churches (along with Catholic associations/groups), and capitalist class 
(business groups). This “power bloc,” Hedman has argued, played behind 
the scene of  the mass mobilization once the country underwent crises of  
authority that are potential to undermine, not only oligarchic democracy 
in this state, but also the hegemony of  the “trinity” of  the country’s 
socio-political powers. 
Borrowing Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s analytical 
26 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In The Name of  Civil Society: From Free Election Movements 
to People Power in the Philippines (Honolulu: University of  Hawai’i Press, 2006), p. 9. 
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frameworks,27 Hedman regards the trio U.S. government, Catholic-related 
associations, and business communities as a “historic” or “dominant” 
bloc of  the Philippines’ social forces. As a result, although the wave 
of  massive movements were able to shift and replace the country’s 
dictatorial regimes, basic class structure and system do not change in part 
because the country’s class structure are still hierarchical (e.g. capitalist 
groups/bourgeois class or religious elites vs. workers, peasants, and 
subaltern classes who constitute the vast majority of  the population, 
or big landowners vis a vis local bosses affiliated to particular political 
parties) and those trio social forces have still become major players 
to drive and control the Philippines’ politics and democracy. Based 
on her observation on unchanging phenomena of  the post-people 
power revolution, Hedman, then, does not consider the election-watch 
campaigns (in 1953, 1969, and 1986) plus the 2001 people power as 
the civil society’s impressive accomplishment, but rather a sort of  mass 
mobilization in the name of  civil society. Hedman also highlights the 
continuation of  electoral fraud, manipulation, and violence over the 
years in the domain of  the Philippine politics, added with the long-term 
practices of  presidential cronyism and money politics,” and considers 
these facts as the indicators of  the limited impact of  the above mass-
based mobilization and movements.28 
Hedman’s emphasis on the powerful role of  the U.S., along with 
its agencies and networks, the Catholic Churches, and capitalist class in 
the shape of  the post-independence Philippines’ politics in general and 
in the process of  the mass mobilization in particular can be understood 
partly because this “power bloc” has deep roots in the country’s history 
and politics since the times of  colonial era, “with the very nature of  both 
the state and the public sphere in the archipelago shaped first by the 
church, later by American colonial rule, and increasingly by capitalist class 
nurtured under both of  their auspices.”29 During the American colonial 
rule from 1898 up to the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, American 
administrators had enjoyed great success in stage-managing the process 
of  decolonization through “the imposition of  carefully crafted political 
27 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International 
Publishers, 1972).
28 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In The Name of  Civil Society, p. 5.
29 Ibid., p. 20. Cf. Luis Francia, History‍of ‍the‍Philippines. 
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institutions in the colony (e.g. decentralized presidential democracy), 
the diffusion of  metropolitan culture (e.g. the English language), and 
the gradual transfer of  power to trusted local allies (e.g. the oligarchy 
consolidated under the American rule).”30  
The Catholic Church, furthermore, had played a major role in the 
creation of  both the state and the public sphere in the country’s lowland 
Christianized areas over more than three centuries of  Spanish colonial 
rule. In addition to church-sponsored educational institutions—from 
primary schools up to universities, particularly since the 19th century—the 
Catholic Church has also expanded its authority and influence within civil 
society through the support of  voluntary associational activity. Through 
private education, Hedman said, the Catholic Church has continued to 
combine its monopoly on the “sanctification of  rites of  passage” for most 
Filipinos with prominent role in the intellectual shape and socialization 
of  the country’s ruling class. The Philippines’ leading representatives of  
Catholicism, furthermore, have closely channeled the church’s identity 
and interests to those of  business class and government officials so that 
has given rise to “conspiracy theory” about the “Jesuit Mafia” and the 
“Octopus Dei.”31 
The third dominant bloc Hedman stresses is the capitalist/business 
class which first came into prominence in the mid-nineteenth century with 
the opening of  the Philippines’ seaports to foreign trade and overseas 
business, as well as the abolition of  the monopolistic privileges of  the 
Spanish provincial governors. These changes facilitated the easy access 
of  European merchants, mostly the British, to the archipelago, with port 
cities around the country emerging as entrepots for local commodities, 
especially sugar, and Western-manufactured products (e.g. textiles). 
This world trade, in turn, was able to create a new “middle class” and 
well-established business communities such as the Filipino mestizos 
(Filipinos of  mixed descent: Malayan, European, or Chinese) and criollos 
(the Philippines-born Spaniards). By American officials, the interests of  
this new emerging capitalist group “were reconciled with those of  the 
Catholic Church and the colonial state, under the auspices of  a liberal 
framework of  governance and economic development.” Over time, this 
30 Ibid., pp. 22-3. Cf. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image.
31 Ibid., pp. 25-34.
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business class advanced an ever greater capacity to affirm its domination 
in the sphere of  civil society.32 
Since the 1946 independence, Hedman has argued, the workings 
of  what Gramsci termed “transformism”33 have protected and secured 
this dominant position through “the sublimation of  abiding tensions and 
threats from ‘above’ and ‘below’ within the realm of  political society,” i.e. 
political parties and the state. Hedman says that it was under conditions 
of  the country’s profound crisis of  hegemony and authority (in 1953, 
1969, 1986, and 2000/2001) that this bloc of  social forces involved in 
counter-mobilization in the domain of  civil society.34 In short, Hedman’s 
arguments lie in the legacy of  those three elements of  the dominant 
bloc which enjoyed the central position in the Philippines’ public sphere 
since the Spanish colonial era, and these three socio-political forces have 
preserved a position of  structural dominance in the face of  diverse social 
change and returning challenge over the years since the country gained 
its independence.  
Hedman’s pessimistic views towards the Philippines’ civil society 
movements can be understood in part because she used, and was 
influenced by Gramsci’s theoretical frameworks of  civil society. Rather 
than viewing civil society as a “counter-balance” against state power 
or a potential element to challenge state’s dominant political authority, 
the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci argued that the “assemble 
of  organisms called ‘private’—including civic associations and religious 
groups, or let’s say “civil society,” helps to uphold the “power of  the 
bourgeois state by facilitating rule through the mobilization of  consent 
or hegemony.”35 Thus, for Gramsci, civil society does exist but its 
function is to co-opt individual positions or as an instrument to secure 
the interests of  the ruling groups (the power bloc) or the dominant 
32 Ibid., pp. 34-41. 
33 Hedman defines Gramsci’s “transformism” as follows, “the parliamentary 
expression of  [the] political moral and political hegemony” of  a ruling class and to 
the process of  “gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which varied 
in their effectiveness, of  the active elements produced by allied groups—and even of  
those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile.” See 
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In The Name of  Civil Society.
34 Ibid., pp. 11-2.
35 Ibid., pp. 6-7; Cf. Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince. 
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class in society. Through this Gramsci’s concept of  “state/dominant 
group-co-opted civil society,” Hedman examines the Philippines’ cases 
of  mass mobilization described above. It is, then, understandable why 
Hedman views civil society-based movement of  the Philippines as a sort 
of  “pseudo-democratic impulse” mainly because the movement resulted 
in little change. In other words, the movement resulted in the “glass-
half  empty” (because the power bloc, political system, and basic class 
structure do not change) and not the “glass-full” (i.e. Western-style liberal 
democracy, in which every individual has equal rights and opportunity).  
Although Hedman’s study provides a useful resource to understand 
the religious and political dynamics of  the Philippines, her claims and 
skeptical analyses seem inaccurate. Her overemphasis on the powerful 
role of  the U.S. (including CIA), the Catholic Church, and the capitalist 
class as a “united single” is an exaggeration and tends to ignore the 
variety of  Catholic associations, business groups, or even the U.S.-linked 
agencies and institutions, as well as the involvement of  agents of  change 
outside the church and business communities, such as civic associations, 
women’s groups, NGOs, universities’ students, peasants, and workers, 
among others. Her comments on unchanging democratic movements 
and “fruitless impacts” in the Philippines are also not entirely true. The 
1986 mass mobilization and the 2001 people power in particular were 
led by very broad-based civil society and religious groups, not simply 
dubbed “three dominant blocs.” Further, her views of  static impacts 
of  those pro-democracy movements are inapt. Such outlook tends to 
disregard the accomplishment of  Quirino’s successor: Ramon Magsaysay 
and Marcos’s successor: Cory Aquino.
A vocal spokesman against communism during the Cold War, 
Ramon Magsaysay was considered to be the champion of  democracy 
and civil liberties. Ushering, indeed, a new era in Philippine government, 
President Magsaysay placed emphasis upon service to the people, 
regardless of  their ethno-religious origins. His administration was also 
regarded as one of  the world’s cleanest and most corruption-free at 
the time; thereby his presidency was cited as the Philippines’ Golden 
Years. Throughout his presidency, trade and industry flourished, rural 
economies boosted as he initiated agrarian reforms, and the Filipino 
people were given international recognition in democracy, cultures, 
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and foreign affairs. As a result, the Philippines ranked second in Asia’s 
clean and well-governed countries. Moreover, during the reign of  Cory 
Aquino, a world-renowned advocate of  democracy, citizenship culture, 
peace, and women’s empowerment, she oversaw the promulgation of  
a new constitution, which limited the powers of  the presidency and 
established a bicameral legislature, which is a vital democracy institution. 
Her administration also gave a strong emphasis and concern for civil 
liberties and human rights, and peace talks with communist insurgents and 
Muslim secessionists. Aquino’s economic policies centered on bringing 
back economic health and confidence and focused on creating a market-
oriented and socially responsible economy.
It is also imperative to point out that the historic and dramatic 
event of  the 1986 revolution or momentous “coalitional” religious and 
civil society elements that was able to topple the dictatorial and corrupt 
regime Marcos was a significant moment of  pro-democracy movements 
in the country, so were in the 1953 pro-democracy movement and the 
2001 people power-based revolution. However, unfortunately, Hedman 
does not recognize it as the Philippines’ civil society’s accomplishment. 
Again, Hedman’s accusation of  the Catholic Church as the part of  the 
“dominant bloc” that served sectarian interest groups has ignored the 
facts of  the Church’s support of  democracy, public cultures of  civility, 
political reforms, “green earth” (read, environmental issues), women’s 
empowerment, as well as of  the Catholic oppositions and struggle against 
tyranny or human rights’ abuses committed by both state and society. By 
Hedman, the country’s press freedom as the one of  the main conduits 
of  (liberal) democracy, political liberties, and egalitarianism has also been 
undervalued. 
The data sketched above suggest that Hedman’s pessimistic 
outlooks toward the Philippines’ pro-democracy mobilization and 
religious/civil society movements are built upon her “ideal-type” of  
liberal democracy, in addition to suspicious views of  religion, civil 
society, and state-level politics. The fact that the post-independence 
Philippines’ class and religious-based associational life, as depicted in 
previous paragraphs, have some elements of  colonial legacy, it does not 
mean that the nature and actors of  civil society is unchanging. Indeed, 
there have been a great number of  civil society associations or religious 
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institutions that serve as a vehicle of  the interests of  particular dominant 
groups, as Gramsci and Hedman believe, but there are also numerous 
religiously civic associations, notably the Catholic churches, function as 
a means to safeguard democratic civility and the implementation of  civic 
culture as Alexis Tocqueville36 and his followers have argued. Accordingly, 
emphasizing solely on “uncivil” aspects of  civil society will be misleading. 
On the contrary, focusing exclusively on romanticist views of  powerful 
and good civil society will also be misreading to the multiple facts and 
faces of  civil society associations—and religious groupings and networks. 
Furthermore, although there are numerous examples of  “uncivil 
states” (i.e. intolerant, violent, and undemocratic governments), including 
those of  the Philippines, it does not mean that there is no “civil” state 
(i.e. democratic governance). Focusing merely on dictatorial regimes 
is “unfair judgment” to other facts of  political life. In the case of  the 
Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay and Cory Aquino in particular deserve 
credits for their democratic efforts and political reforms. Even Marcos 
himself, apart from his dictatorship and corrupt behaviors, did some 
developmental programs and education projects for the Philippine 
societies. It is thus significant for scholars, commentators, and analysts 
in order to be fair, careful, and balanced in examining the varied social 
facts of  political life whether in society or state-level politics, as well as 
varied cultural phenomena of  human societies. 
To sum up, it is unrealistic and unfair if  one wishes or even forces 
to implement a sort of  Western-style liberal democracy within non-
Western countries. Each society has their own social-political structure, 
history, and “culture of  politics” so that the strict implementation of  
liberal democracy might be inapt for a particular society. Looking at the 
political experiences of  non-Western societies, especially in Southeast 
Asia, one can find numerous examples of  the practices of  “non-liberal” 
democracy that need to be appreciated. What society need is not the 
concept of  “Western-style liberal democracy,” but, among other things, 
a representation of  various groups in order to “make democracy works,” 
to borrow Robert Putnam’s famous phrase,37 as well as to prevent the rise 
36 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2007). 
37 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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and dominance of  any single block whether based on religion, gender, 
class, ideology, ethnicity, or other sectarian groupings. Following the 
florescence of  either continuing or new sectarian groups in modern 
era, such representation is vital to guarantee and secure the ideals of  
politics and citizenship of  each individual, as well as the social stability 
and democratic civility of  a nation and society.  
C. Indonesia: Muslims and Political Activism 
If  the Philippines has been Southeast Asia’s most severely class-
stratified, Indonesian societies have been deeply ideologized. To put it 
differently, Indonesian history had long been marked by an ideology-based 
strict division since the times of  European colonial era and radicalized 
during Sukarno’s Old Order when “aliranization” (lit. streamlining) had 
been deeply politicized and exploited by both political and religious 
actors for their sectarian interests. During the course of  Sukarno’s 
reign, particularly since the 1950s, Indonesian nationalists, communists, 
traditionalists, and reformists were all “trapped” into unhealthy 
competition and violent conflicts on behalf  of  primordial sectarian 
societies. Over the course of  Suharto’s New Order, “streamlining-type 
politics” (politik aliran) was still strong, albeit ideological and cultural 
content were change, in part due to the spread of  Islam and democracy. 
The prolonged ideological divisions of  Indonesian society later led the 
country into a brutal carnage among the nation’s inhabitants, especially 
the militia groups, first in the East Java’s Madiun uprising of  1948, and the 
second was the national tragedy of  the state-sponsored anti-communist 
killings of  1965-66.38 Such severe societal divisions along religious and 
ideological lines, it should be noted, were not new phenomena, but rather 
were deeply rooted long before Indonesia gained its independence in 
1945, especially during the Dutch colonial rule (and later Japanese). This 
paper, however, does not suggest that such split was solely by products 
of  colonialism since there were various factors that contributed to the 
sectarian divides, including the “Middle East” influences, (especially Cairo, 
38 On the anti-communist massacre in 1948 and 1965-66, see Elizabeth Swift, 
The‍Road‍ to‍Madiun:‍The‍ Indonesian‍Communist‍Uprising‍ of ‍ 1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University SEAP Publications, 1989); Robert Cribb, Indonesian‍Killings‍1965‍(Victoria, 
Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1991). 
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Mecca, and Medina networks), print media, schooling, and the flow of  
Muslim reformists, among others. 
Although the nineteenth-century in particular had been the turning 
point for the surge of  Islamic reforms, thereby reformist Muslims (or 
reform-minded Muslims) that later became one of  the main players in 
the state’s history of  politics and democracy, it was not until early the 
20th century that the ideas of  Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism 
began to influence and attracted a wider audience of  “Jawi Muslim” 
in the archipelago, especially after the founding of  some reformist 
Islamic organizations. G.F. Pijper (1893-1988), one of  the last colonial 
administrators to be trained by Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), 
the eminent Dutch orientalist and advisor for “Muslim affairs” on the 
Indies, wrote: “When Snouck Hurgronje left the Netherlands Indies 
in 1906, there was as yet nothing known in this land of  reformism or 
modernism, the newer religious movements within Islam. During his 
seventeen-year Indonesian stay, Snouck Hurgronje knew Islam as the 
religion transmitted by the ancestors. In none of  his writings of  this 
period is there a trace to be found of  the religious phenomena of  the 
newer times.”39 
Hurgronje’s observation on the zero evidence of  Muslim 
modernists and reformists throughout his stay in the archipelago could 
be incorrect partly because Wahhabism had already reached the shores 
of  the Indies since the first decades of  the 19th century, albeit did not 
experience any notable progress in the decades following the Padri War in 
West Sumatra.40 His remark, however, indicates that the early 20th century 
actually had been the decisive moment for the growth of  modernist and 
reformist Muslim groupings in this region. As historian of  Indonesian 
Islam Michael Laffan has noted, the transmission from Sufism to Islamic 
reformism into the archipelago was shaped, not by reformist Arabs, by 
Malay Muslim scholars but “ultimately linked to Cairo, where printing and 
public activism were becoming a hallmark of  the new Salafi movement 
of  Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida.” As part of  their 
platform and objective to “reorganize” and reorder Muslim society, 
39 Quoted in Michael Laffan, The Makings of  Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the 
Narration‍of ‍a‍Sufi‍Past (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 177. 
40 See Michael Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below 
the Winds (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). 
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Laffan says, this movement “called upon Muslims to break with the older 
patronage networks organized around the tarekat [Sufi orders] and the 
sayyid”41 [i.e. an honorific title accorded in Muslim societies to those who 
are reputed to descend from the Prophet Muhammad]. 
In contrast to radical Wahhabism, the modernist and reformist 
current were more successful in attracting—and influencing—“Jawi 
Muslims” in part due to Malay-language journals, called al-Imam, published 
in Singapore and Sumatra by pilgrims converted to the modernist 
notions of  Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and his students, especially 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935). The publication of  al-Imam was 
inspired by Egypt’s main voice of  Islamic modernism and reformism, 
al-Manar, which was led by Rashid Rida. Through al-Imam, edited by 
Syeikh Muhammad Alkalali, a native of  Minangkabau of  West Sumatra, 
the Malay reformists continued to voice Islamic reforms, battled against 
Sufis, restricted Sufism, and promoted extending a proper understanding 
of  shari’ah to a widening circle of  readers in the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago. The surge of  Salafi and modernist Islam, for the moment, 
resulted in the collapse of  Sufism and the sayyid-led reforms, but later 
in 1926 by the emergence of  the traditionalist Islamic organization 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic Sufism and traditionalism gained their strong 
supporter. 
Although there were a number of  factors that contributed to the 
flow of  Islamic reforms in the archipelago, two aspects on which the 
Dutch played in great parts worth mentioning. First was the pilgrimage 
(ibadah haji) to the Holy Lands of  Mecca and Medina. The Dutch’s 
initial plan in support of  the hajj in the mid-19th century aimed at 
“domesticating” Indonesian Muslims, hoping that by the hajj they 
would be pious; consequently they would be busy practicing religious 
rituals away from political activism. The previous cases of  anti-Dutch 
movements since early 1820s led by Muslim leaders, notably the revolt of  
Padri in West Sumatra (from 1820 to 1838) and the Java War of  1835-30 
under the captainship of  charismatic Muslim figures such as Pangeran 
Diponegoro (1785-1855) and Kiai Mojo, made the Dutch aware of  the 
danger of  Muslim politics or political Islam. Unfortunately, however, 
the Dutch intention to domesticate Muslims by supporting them to do 
41 Michael Laffan, The Makings of  Indonesian Islam, pp. 177-189. 
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hajj (pilgrims) went wrong and fumble because the hajj, along with kiais 
(i.e. Javanese-type Islamic clerics), ulama, reformist Muslims and villagers 
or ordinary townspeople, became one of  the main leaders of  rebellions 
against the Dutch. Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo (d. 2007) in 
his fine “classic” works such as The Peasants’ Revolt of  Banten in 1888 and 
Protest Movement in Rural Java has well described such anti-Dutch campaigns 
by these groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries.42 
Aiming at getting an easy access to the Holy Lands, the Dutch 
introduced steamship technology around 1850s. As an outcome of  this 
policy, added with the opening of  the Suez Canal in 1869, pilgrims from 
Jawi land (i.e. a term at the time refers not only to Java Island but also 
Indonesian-Malay archipelago) consisted of  the single largest community 
in Mecca and Medina in the following years. However, this pilgrimage 
resulted in “unintended consequences” on the part of  the Dutch, namely 
the massive impact of  the notions of  modernism and nationalism, as well 
as the flow of  reformist Muslims. The second channel of  the Islamic 
reforms was schooling (Islamic education). The pilgrimage provided a 
great opportunity for Indonesian Muslims to learn and study Islamic 
teachings from the main centers of  Islam: the “Haramain” (Mecca and 
Medina). After returning to Indonesia, these pilgrims then built religious 
schools (madrasah) that later became one of  the primary vehicles of  
Islamic reformism and revivalism in the archipelago. Islamic schooling 
also became a catalyst to look at a reformed Islam and society, and a 
canal for political movements. In addition to madrasah, pilgrims also 
established pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) which for centuries 
became engines of  change and played a vital role in the spread of  Islam 
in the archipelago, in addition to tarekat or the Sufi brotherhoods. Till 
today, as Andree Feillard and Remy Madinier have noticed, most of  the 
42 No doubt haji and kiai in the nineteenth centuries had enormously played 
significant role not only as a charismatic religious figure directing religious ceremonies 
and Islamization processes but also a political leader taking the lead socio-political 
movements against the Dutch colonials and the colonial-backed local aristocrats as in the 
case of  Banten War in 1888, as well as the resistance of  Kiai Ahmad Rifa’i, along with 
his Rifa’iyah in Central Java, and other Muslims and religious leaders in the 19th and 20 
centuries. See Sartono Kartodirdjo’s studies, among others, The Peasants’ Revolt of  Banten 
in 1888: A Case Study of  Social Movements in Indonesia (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1966) and his Protest Movements in Rural Java (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
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religious education taught outside of  schools is dispensed by thousands 
of  pesantren (in 2004, according to the data from the Ministry of  Religion, 
the number of  pesantren reaches 14,556) to millions of  students.43 
These Islamic reforms, however, did not constitute a single 
group that had similar views and understandings of  Islamic teachings, 
discourses, and religious traditions, and how Islam should be performed.44 
An easy and obvious example of  such sort was the division between the 
“old group” (kaum tua) and the “new group” (kaum muda). Interestingly, 
such religious separation or “religious classification” not only exited in 
Java, but also in Sumatra, particularly West Sumatra of  Minangkabau 
and the Gayo highland of  Aceh, and in Ambon and central Maluku.45 
Despite their characters as “reform-minded Muslim groups,” these new 
Muslim groups have had different features and understandings in terms 
of  how Islam should be practiced in a society and state. 
The kaum tua, although not fixed, were typically characterized by 
the following features: (1) traditionalism (prone to local traditions), (2) 
more loosing regarding Islamic teachings (e.g. veiling), (3) respecting on 
early generations of  Muslim scholars and jurists (fuqaha’), (4) utilizing 
43 Andree Feillard and Remy Madinier, The‍End‍of ‍ Innocence?‍ Indonesian‍ Islam‍
and the Temptations of  Radicalism (Honolulu: University of  Hawai’i Press, 2011), pp. 6-7. 
44 The forms of  reformed Islam and reformist Muslims, as described by 
Merle C. Ricklefs, varied ranging from Puritanism (purification-oriented Islam), anti 
Sufism faction, shari’ah-minded groups, shari’ah-based Sufism, reformed traditionalists, 
among others. The basic ideas of  the Muslim reformists, however, mostly the same: 
the eagerness to make Islam to be more “pristine” as it was performed by salafus-salih 
(i.e. early generations of  Muslims) by avoiding local and “non-Islamic” aspects. These 
reformists, hence, would never tolerate religious practices and communities that 
opposed their strict Islamic conviction and beliefs. As a result “syncretic Muslims” such 
as Java’s abangan had become one of  the main targets of  the reformists’ Islamization. 
See more on the discussion of  these groups in the works of  M.C. Ricklefs: Polarizing 
Javanese‍Society:‍Islamic‍and‍other‍Visions‍(c.‍1830-1930) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007) and 
his Mystic‍Synthesis‍in‍Java:‍A‍History‍of ‍Islamization‍from‍the‍Fourteenth‍to‍the‍early‍Nineteenth‍
Centuries (Norwalk: EastBridge Publishing, 2006).  
45 On the discussion on West Sumatra see Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: 
The kaum Muda Movement in Sumatra (London, UK: Equinox Publishing, 2009); on the 
Gayo Muslims see John R. Bowen, Muslim through Discourse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); on Maluku Islam see Richard Chauvel, “Ambon’s Other Half: 
Some Preliminary Observations on Ambonese Moslem Society and History,” Review of  
Indonesian and Malay Affairs 14 (1), 1980, pp. 40-80. 
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multiple classical Islamic resources (e.g. kitab kuning) and methodologies 
(e.g. qiya>s,‍ istih}‍san,‍mas}‍lah}‍at‍mursalah}‍, and the like), (5) practicing taqli>d 
(religious imitation) on certain religious issues, (6) accommodating local 
elements of  cultures or adat (customs) as long as they are in line with 
the spirit of  Islam (i.e. bid’ah al-h} asana or “good innovation”). The kaum 
muda, moreover, was typified by (1) modernism, (2) more emphasis on 
the Qur’an and h} adi>th, (3) more ‘conservative’ and strict in religious 
beliefs, practices and understandings, (4) more excited about ‘secular’ 
sciences, (5) anti-taqli>d, (6) anti-local traditions, adat, and cultures due 
to their beliefs in the “pristine” Islam. These two religious groups, as 
history has witnessed, were quickly defined into doctrinal lines with the 
formation of, among others, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and NU, 
which were frequently involved in fierce religious disputes, not only in 
the field of  Islamic understandings and practices, but also in the arena 
of  political and public life.46 
As Australian foremost historian of  Java Merle C. Ricklefs in his 
fine works, Polarizing Javanese Society and Mystic Synthesis in Java has observed, 
before the growing emergence of  the Islamic reform movements in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in Java in particular, there had 
already been substantial numbers of  professionally religious groups 
such as mosque officials, religious teachers, guardians of  holy sites, and 
students of  pesantren, who were known collectively as kaum (literally 
means “religious folk”) or putihan (literally means the “white people” 
but soon became a marker for the “pious Muslims”) since the 1840s. 
On the northern coast of  Java, these particular Muslim groupings were 
sometimes called kaum santri (i.e. disciples of  pesantren). One of  the 
principle agents of  Java’s Islamization, santri initially applied to students 
of  pesantren, one of  Java’s vital Islamic learning centers, but was gradually 
stretched to encompass very devout Muslims. 
There is no clear evidence whether these groups had formed a 
force for Islamic puritanism, fundamentalism, or revivalism beginning in 
late 19th-century. However, there are similarities among these groups in 
the way they perceived Javanese abangan as ignorant, backward, impure, 
and impious. Literally means the “red people,” the term abangan was used 
46 On the modernist Muslim movement, see Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim 
Movement‍in‍Indonesia,‍1900-1942‍(London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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by kaum santri to designate nominal Muslims who “did not fulfill the 
minimal obligations of  their religion and who maintained or developed 
in loco attitudes that were unacceptable for their more orthodox fellow 
believers.”47 Some Muslim puritans also called themselves kaum putihan, 
meaning “religious folk,” to differentiate themselves to the abangan group. 
At the same time, the abangan (sometimes called abritan) responded 
negatively to the pressures for a more purified form of  religious life 
advocated by the putihan. The rivalry between the abangan and the putihan 
groups can be read in a number of  Javanese “old” literatures such as 
Serat/Suluk‍Gatholoco,‍ Serat‍Cebolek,‍ Serat‍Darmagandhul,‍ Babad‍Kedhiri,‍
Serat Centini, among others. Thus, as Merle Ricklefs has rightly pointed 
out, more than one hundred years before the harsh conflict between the 
traditionalist, modernist, abangan, either linked to communist or nationalist 
groups, took place in the 1950s/1960s, Java and some parts of  the country 
had witnessed the ruthless rivalry and unhealthy conflict among religious 
groups, particularly between the orthodox and heterodox Muslims.48  
The data sketched above suggest that the genesis of  Indonesia’s 
religious-based polarization was since the mid-nineteenth century. This 
division and segmentation continued in the early twentieth century and 
even more institutionalized, politicized, ideologized, and became harder, 
deeper, and more conflictual. In the early twentieth century the forms of  
47 Andree Feillard and Remy Madinier, The End of  Innocence, p. 8. 
48 While since the late nineteenth century the abangan appeared as the majority 
social category and opposed the putihan’s ideas of  “the proper understanding of  Islam,” 
a tiny minority of  Javanese rejected Islam altogether and became Christians for the 
first time in the Javanese history led by some extraordinary figures as Kiai Ibrahim 
Tunggul Wulung and, above all, Kiai Sadrah Surapranata who converted thousands of  
Javanese to Christianity prior to his death in 1924 and then established the Javanese 
Christian Churches (Gereja Kristen Jawi), an amalgamation of  European-Christian 
beliefs and Javanese cultures and concepts. Another faction of  Javanese society was 
priyayi who enthusiastically embraced European learning and life style (Ricklefs called 
“westernizers”) but still regarded themselves as Muslims, not Christians. Not all priyayi 
were happy with, and pragmatically embraced Islam, however, some priyayi rejected 
Islam altogether and wanted to return to Buda age. For them, the Islamization process 
of  Javanese society was a great “historical mistake” and as a result they advocated 
anti-Islamic movements and supported Budi-Buda teachings by tracing back to the 
pre-Islamic Java. The emergence of  anti-Islamic literatures such as Babad Kedhiri, Suluk 
Gatholoco, and Serat Darmagandhul in the 1870s can be seen from this point of  view. see 
more in M.C. Ricklefs: Polarizing Javanese Society; his Mystic Synthesis in Java. 
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organizing and mobilizing people and of  distributing ideas were more 
modern. Religious and cultural practices, educational style, and social class 
were defined by formal organizations, and also began to be more political. 
To borrow Max Weber’s term, the early twentieth century of  Indonesia 
was marked by the process of  “rationalization” and “systematization” 
of  knowledge, cultures, and traditions of  Indonesian/Javanese society.49 
Such a process is understandable in part because since the early twentieth 
century, the Dutch rule provided education for Indonesians as part of  its 
new “ethical policy.” As a result, the number of  Javanese and Indonesians 
receiving a more modern education grew significantly. Although in the 
light of  Indonesia’s large and rapidly growing population (about 59.1 
million in 1930) the number getting a modern education was a very 
poor performance on the part of  colonial power, it contributed to the 
shape of  tiny educated elite who played a vital role in the formation of  
anti-colonial and nationalist movements. During this period, Islamic 
organizations, whether associated with traditionalist or reformist Islam 
also expanded their educational activities. 
Increasingly polarized Indonesian and Javanese society since the 
mid-19th century described earlier began to organize in a more systematic 
way in the form of  a modern organization in the early 20th century. It 
was during this period actually that organizations, institutions, clubs, or 
political parties, with different ideology, religious or cultural affiliation 
and membership, began to emerge in the stage of  modern Indonesian 
politics: Budi Utomo, Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, Sarikat Islam, 
Sarikat Dagang Islam, Partai Komunis Indonesia, al-Irsyad, Persatuan 
Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama. Tragically these distinctive groups were 
deeply involved in violent conflicts (e.g. Sarikat Islam or Islamic Union 
versus Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) and 
harsh disputes (e.g. Muhammadiyah and other putihan groups versus 
abangan; Nahdlatul Ulama versus Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam). 
These conflicting parties as well as ideological, or religious-based violence 
re-emerged in the post-independent Indonesia, and even it was far more 
violent, conflictual and deeply politicized. During this era one can see how 
political and religious leaders “vibrantly” provoked their opposition and 
49 Robert W. Hefner, Hindu‍ Javanese:‍ Tengger‍ Tradition‍ and‍ Islam‍ (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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adherence on behalf  of  particular religion, Islamic school of  thoughts, 
organization, ideology, and political party. In this historical schema, the 
tragic event of  1965-66 can be understood. It was not the incident without 
historical precedent. But rather this disastrous drama of  anti-communist 
was deeply rooted in the history of  Indonesia/Java: the history of  conflict, 
hatred, arrogance, and violence. 
The Japanese, by conducting training of  militias’ organizations 
and mobilizing modernist and traditionalist Muslims, also contributed 
to the formation of  deepening “pillarization” of  Indonesian societies. 
During the five years of  Japanese occupation associational life, especially 
religious-based “civil” societies grew rapidly. In addition, Japan, driven 
by the need for their resistance against the U.S.-led alliance, participated 
in the process of  “militanization” of  the societies based on particular 
ideology (e.g. secular-nationalism and communism) as well as Islamic 
stream (traditionalism, modernism/reformism). It is within this historical 
context that the emergence of  the Darul Islam’s rebellion in 1948 in West 
Java (the rebellion re-emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as in the 
1970s under the banner of  “Komando Jihad”) and the 1948 “Madiun 
Tragedy” (this anti-communist killings reappeared in 1965-66) against 
radical communists can be understood. 
Although the Japanese facilitated to the growth of  associational life, 
“civic” associations, “primordial” groups, political society, even “civil” 
society associations, whether based on ethnic, region, religion, ideology, 
or profession, including a great number of  Muslim groups, had already 
taken place prior to independence in 1945.50 These facts suggest that, 
despite a “story of  bitterness” described in previous pages which provide 
background to understand harsh conflict and tensions among religious 
divides in the post-independence period, Indonesian Muslims and society 
have a long history of  intellectual and organizational pluralism. This 
pluralist precedent was rooted in the fact that Islam was introduced to 
50 Examples of  these organizations, in addition to religious-based associations 
depicted in previous paragraphs, are Perhimpunan Pemuda Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Associations of  Youths, an independent body whose main objective was to raise public 
awareness of  nationalist movements), Bandung Study Club in which Sukarno became 
of  its members, Indonesian National Association (i.e. an embryo of  Partai Nasionalis 
Indonesia), Jong Java, Jong Ambon, Jong Sumatra, Jong Celebes, the Indonesian 
Associations of  Students, Pemuda Kaum Betawi, and so forth. 
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this country through a network of  trade and city-states, not by a military 
conquest. Unlike their Arab and Middle Eastern counterparts, Islam was 
introduced and brought to Indonesia or Southeast Asia in general by, 
among others, peaceful merchants, Sufis, travelers, teachers, preachers, 
and gurus, and not by violent armed forces. During the colonial period, as 
anthropologist Robert W. Hefner has rightly pointed out, that “politically 
dispersive pattern was reinforced rather than diminished.”51 Thanks 
to the Dutch officials who strictly separated Islam from state domain, 
the collonial policy was able to drive Muslim groups and organizations 
away from state and global politics into the sphere of  society and public 
cultures; consequently it helps to create a “remarkable Islamic tradition 
of  grass-roots association and civic independence.” Although Islamic 
reform movements appeared since the mid or late nineteenth century 
as an outcome of  the surge of  hajj and students coming from Arab and 
the Middle East that contributed to the complication of  the process of  
pluralization, but “not done away with this intellectual and organizational 
pluralism.”52 
Nonetheless, despite these precedents for cultural pluralism and 
“civic” organization, some Muslim groups (as well as the “radical left”) 
remain ambiguous about civil democratic ideals. No doubt, the country’s 
early civic associations and associational life had different point of  views 
with regard to the ideals of  politics and citizenship in the late colonial 
and post-independence Indonesia. While some strict reformist Muslims, 
fantasizing a medieval Islamic golden age when Islam functioned as a 
religion and state at once and forgetting their historical plurality, idealized 
Islam as an “ideal-type” for Indonesian ideology. The Piagam Jakarta (the 
Jakarta Charter) was evidence of  their desires to implement Islam, the 
Qur’an, and Islamic law as the political foundation of  this new nation-
state. Moderate, secular-nationalist, and neo-traditionalist Muslims, 
by contrast, believed that the new Indonesia should be built based on 
“all-encompassing ideology” conducive to fulfill the needs and interests 
of  various social groupings coming from different religious and ethnic 
51 Robert W. Hefner, “On the History and Cross-Cultural Possibility of  a 
Democratic Ideal,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Democratic‍Civility:‍the‍History‍and‍Cross-
Cultural Possibility of  a Modern Political Ideal (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), p. 21.
52 Ibid. 
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backgrounds that also greatly contributed to the nationalist movements. 
In post-independence Indonesia, these political and religious 
groups have different stories. During Sukarno’s Old Order, four 
political parties deeply affiliated with particular religious and ideological 
streams came up to the stage of  Indonesian politics and succeeded in 
the “struggle for existence.” These political champions included Partai 
Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party), Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party), Masyumi (modernist-
reformist Islamism), and Nahdhatul Ulama (neo-traditionalism). In the 
1950s, since society was deeply divided into nationalist, communist, 
traditionalist, and modernist (“aliranization”), Indonesian people feared 
of  being associated into particular ideological groupings. Due to its 
leaders had been accused of  being the backers of  separatist uprisings in 
post-independence Indonesia held by PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia); Sukarno banned Masjumi in 1960, and jailed a 
numbers of  its leaders. One of  the Masjumi leaders, in 1967, Muhammad 
Natsir (d. 1993) established Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII, 
the Indonesian Council of  Islamic Mission) which has become the 
backbone of  the Wahabi in the archipelago. The fate of  PKI was the most 
tragic in the history of  Indonesian politics since Suharto’s New Order, 
allied with conservative, modernist, and traditionalist Muslims, bitterly 
cracked them down and murdered huge numbers of  its members and 
sympathizers in the anti-communist campaigns of  1965/66. Although 
the New Order did not physically and publicly kill the supporters of  the 
PNI, their political activities were domesticated, if  not “mummified,” at 
the corner of  Indonesian history and politics under the banner of  the 
newly established political party under the auspices of  the New Order: 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party). 
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization 
which became a political party in 1950s by the name of  Partai Nahdlatul 
Ulama (PNU), had shared the same story with the PNI. Along with 
other modernist Islamic elements such as Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
(Parmusi), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), and Partai Sarikat 
Islam Indonesia (PSII), PNU was forcibly fused by Suharto into a 
new political party controlled by the government named PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan) in January, 1973. During the early period of  
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the New Order, Suharto severely turned to control Islamist elements, 
albeit these Muslim groups contributed in setting up Suharto into power 
by participating hand-in-hand with then-the New Order to destroy 
communist members, as well as followers and sympathizers of  the 
PKI. Suharto’s “divide-and-rule” strategy was obvious throughout his 
32-year-old rule. By 1984, however, PNU, under the leadership of  K.H. 
Abdurrahman Wahid and K.H. Ahmad Siddiq, declared itself  out of  
the PPP (and any political party) and devoted to the grassroots struggle 
(bottom-up model) or “cultural strategy,” to borrow Wahid’s term (as 
opposed to Amin Rais’s “structural strategy” or “top-down approach”). 
Under the headship of  K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, NU was evolved and 
transformed into a powerful civil society force functioned as a means of  
counterbalance power of  the authoritarian New Order. 
Due to Suharto’s ruthless treatment toward the reformist/Islamist 
groupings and the devotees of  Islamism, a political movement aiming 
at establishing of  an Islamic nation/state, Indonesian Muslims began to 
shift from the sphere of  politics to culture. As a result, this archipelago 
witnesses the emergence of  a new form of  Islamic groups such as, 
first, the “renewalists,” a group who were concerned about the ideas of  
cultural renewal (e.g. Islamic education, social movements, or Islamic 
democracy), and secondly, “Islamic resurgent group,” namely a group 
of  Muslims who emphasized the deepening piety (individual piousness) 
and the implementation of  the pillars of  Islamic faith. President Suharto 
himself  greatly contributed to the growth of  this sort of  Muslim 
grouping through the government-sponsored national developmental 
policy (kebijakan pembangunan nasional) which can be broken down into 
three programs: building-up program (pembinaan), schooling, and dakwah 
(Islamic propagation) movement. 
Initially intended to eliminate the influences of  communism, the 
pembinaan movement in particular greatly contributed to the shape of  
Islamic ideals and proper Muslims away from political activism. The New 
Order’s impressive and extensive Islamic education programs, added with 
the dakwah movement, were able to enhance the production of  Islamic 
piety and revivalist/puritanical Muslims as well as the decline of  nominal 
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Muslim groups (i.e. the abangan and kebatinan).53 As a result, by the 1990s, 
Indonesia has transformed itself  from a secular, less-Islamic society 
to become a sort of  a “green state” as many Muslims became “pious” 
or “religious.” Suharto himself, to perform his piety, began to shift his 
Islamic style from a Javanese-kebatinan-Muslim to a kind of  a devout 
Muslim by conducting pilgrimage to Mecca (ibadah haji) and sponsoring 
the establishment of  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association). Against this backdrop, thus, 
seeing Islamic revivalism and resurgence separate from local political 
authority is misleading partly because, as the Dutch anthropologist Martin 
van Bruinessen has aptly pointed out, “it was Suharto’s turning against 
some of  his erstwhile Chinese and Christian allies and co-opting a large 
part of  the educated Muslim population through the establishment of  
the ICMI that strengthened radical political Islam.”54 
Equally important, the flow of  reform-minded Muslims during the 
course of  what Martin van Bruinessen has termed “santrinization,” added 
with the government-sponsored developmentalism that campaigned about 
the “gender ideals,” contributed to a great damage of  the role of  women 
in public life and religious-related matters. As anthropologist Michael 
Peletz has noticed, throughout Southeast Asia, let alone Vietnam, due 
to their reproductive capacities were viewed as giving them regenerative, 
spiritual, and other religious powers that men could not match, women 
predominated in a good many ritual contexts linked to agriculture, birth, 
death, and healing. In addition to be “ritual specialists,” women played 
a major role in marketplace (e.g. local market) and household economy. 
Women also became a model of  teaching politeness of  their children. 
Accordingly it is not surprising when Peletz typifies traditional Southeast 
Asia as “relatively egalitarian relations between males and females.”55 
53 The fear of  being accused of  atheism and communism drove the abangan 
to convert to Christianity, Hinduism, and notably Islam. That “great conversion” not 
only happened within local Javanese but also Chinese due to the ban of  Confucianism 
since 1967. Besides those political factors, the emergence and the development of  
scripturalist and revivalist Islam also led to the decline of  the abangan practices as well 
as kebatinan movements. 
54 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of  Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research 10:20 (2002), p. 27. 
55 Michael Peletz, “Transgenderism and Gender Pluralism in Southeast Asia 
since Early Modern Times,” Current Anthropology 47:2 (2006), p. 312. 
Catholics, Muslims, and Global Politics in Southeast Asia
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2012 M/1434 H 423
Not only women that played a role in ritual practices did persons 
identified with “third-gender” that lead rituals or what Peletz calls 
“transgendered ritual specialists” also can be found in traditional 
Southeast Asia, such as bissu in South Sulawesi’s Bugis.56 Historically, 
traditional Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, society and local cultures 
also accepted the third category of  sex. The local tradition of  “Reog 
Ponorogo” that performs same-sex marriage and intimacy between 
“warok” and “gemblak” (both are males) also indicates local tolerance 
towards “transgenderism.” However, unfortunately, this traditional 
Southeast Asia’s pluralistic view of  gender is no longer the case in large 
parts of  the country. Government and world religions, including Islam, 
added with individuals having concept of  Western ideals of  sex as only 
male and female, all contributed to the decline of  the “gender pluralism” 
and “transgenderism.”  
Other “unintended consequences” of  the Suharto’s developmental 
programs included the increase of  high literate peoples and, this is the 
least significant part, the growth of  moderate and democrat Muslims that 
later pioneered the reformation process and contributed to the collapse 
of  Suharto’s New Order though a dramatic and historic People Power 
movement in May 1998. Although Suharto tried to build an alliance with 
Islamist elements (e.g. by establishing Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas 
Dunia Islam or KISDI, Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of  
Islamic World) and blamed Christians and Chinese as the main actors of  
Indonesia’s multiple crises, he failed to cease the surge of  civil society-
led democratic movements and political reforms.57 Do these civil society 
movements and pro-democracy elements succeed in bringing Indonesia 
into post-Suharto reformation typified by the creation of  public cultures 
of  civility, egalitarianism, and pluralism or “citizenship culture”? Certainly 
there have been numerous answers regarding this question depending 
on how one measures the indicators of  success or failure. Meredith 
Weiss, for instance, has warned us that the great hopes for post-Suharto 
reformation to implement the “1998 reformasi [lit. “economic-political 
reformation”] agenda” failed because civil society associations and pro-
democracy forces were lack of  what she termed “coalitional capital.” 
56 Ibid., pp. 309-40.
57 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam. 
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In the absence of  coalition among CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) 
and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), Weiss has argued, 
post-Suharto reformasi was fruitless, contrast to neighboring Malaysia, 
in which she saw post-Mahatir government as successful in handling a 
political shift and transforming Malaysia into a prosperous state.58 
Indeed, post-New Order Indonesia had been marked by the 
outbreaks of  ethnoreligious violence scattered from Sampit, Poso, to 
Ambon and North Maluku. Such brutal ethnoreligious violent conflicts 
made the myth of  the “smiling” Indonesia and “civil Islam” characterized 
by democratic civility and tolerant-in-pluralism in a question mark. 
However, seeing solely on the violent elements of  Indonesia also leads 
to the failure of  capturing the whole picture of  Indonesian politics. 
Likewise, viewing post-Suharto Indonesia as “failed state” due to the 
failure of  civil society and political society agents in bringing the agenda 
reformasi into the scene of  Indonesian global politics is also unjust and 
tend to neglect the country’s achievements in attempts of  implementing 
democratization (e.g. free election or press freedom), “regionalism” (e.g. 
regional autonomy), or conflict resolution (e.g. Aceh, Poso, and Maluku). 
Unlike Malaysia focusing on “coalitional capital,” Indonesia’s concern 
has been political/cultural capital, namely democracy. Judging post-
reformation Indonesia as an “intolerant society” due to the rapid growth 
of  Islamist groups is also a sort of  “unjust judgment” partly because 
such views tend to ignore the flow of  moderate elements and pluralist 
Muslims in the country who are concerned about civil democratic ideals. 
Indeed, the future of  Indonesian Islam will be determined in large part 
by the struggle between these two visions of  Islamic politics: Islamist 
groups and moderate Muslim forces. 
D. Concluding Remarks
Looking back the modern history of  Indonesian and Philippine 
politics, especially the dynamics of  religious groups (i.e. Catholics and 
Muslims), civic associations, and state-level politics, a few reflections and 
lessons can be drawn as follows. First, civil society alone is no longer 
enough. To those who had placed great hopes in civil society as the chief  
58 Meredith L. Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Societies and Coalitions for Political 
Change in Malaysia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
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elements of  democracy and civility needs to hold their desires since 
civil society associations cannot guarantee the accomplishment of  civil 
democratic ideals. In other words, civic associations or associational life is 
necessary but never sufficient to secure the practices of  a civil-democratic 
politics. Civil society is not sufficient because CSOs, as indicated in the 
Philippines and Indonesia, can be sectarian groups, either based on 
ethnicity, religion, or class, aiming at achieving sectarian interests that far 
way from “civil democratic ideals” and citizenship culture. In other words, 
civil associations can be a force of  the creation of  a “segmentary civility.” 
Tocquevillian classical and ideal model of  civil society as a “unified 
and coherent entity” functions as a vanguard of  civic culture and a check 
against the tendency toward the centralization of  state’s political power 
is, in many cases, no longer the case. However, I agree with Tocqueville’s 
argument that a “pluralist and self-organizing civil society independent 
of  the state is an indispensable condition of  democracy”.59 One of  
the weaknesses of  Tocqueville’s analyses with regard to civil society 
lies, among other things, in his tendency toward the “reification” and 
“celebration” of  civil society as a powerful force of  counterbalance of  
a state. Despite my criticism against Tocqueville’s notions, however, this 
does not mean that I cheer Gramsci’s theory of  civil society. Although 
Gramsci’s analyses on competition, domination, and conflict among 
elements of  civil society might be true, he failed to grasp various motives 
of  social actors and the achievements of  civil society movements. 
To conclude, while Tocqueville tended to see solely on the positive 
elements of  civil society, Gramsci seemed to be in the opposite direction 
scapegoating civil society only as a canal of  the ruling class. Gramsci also 
undermined the role of  state in creating public cultures of  citizenship, 
one that I disagree with because despite “uncivil states” opposing the 
ideas of  democracy, freedom, egalitarianism, and pluralism, there have 
been “civil states” concerned about civil democratic ideals. Thus both 
Tocqueville and Gramsci were trapped in the extremist views. In this 
case, I am neither Tocquevillian nor Gramscian. 
Second, equally important is that this self-organizing civil society 
must be part of  a larger pattern of  what Hefner has termed “political 
59 Cited in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In The Name of  Civil Society, p. 3; Cf. Alexis 
De Tocqueville, Democracy in America.  
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pluricentrism,” in which no longer social class, group, or organization 
affirms domination or monopoly control over the social, cultural, political, 
and moral resources of  society. Third, in order to keep the balance of  state 
and society, its norms must be scaled up into a “constitutional charter that 
enshrines equality, participation, and tolerance as principles of  law, in a 
manner that protects them from political vicissitudes and socializes them 
among the public at large.”60 This “mutually reinforcing equilibrium” is 
necessary to keep both state and society “on the right track.” If  state is 
too strong while society is too weak it will create tyranny (e.g. Indonesia 
during the reign of  Suharto or the Philippines under Marcos). On the 
other hand, if  society is too strong while state is too weak, it will produce 
chaos and anarchy. Ethnoreligious violence in post-Suharto Indonesia 
was one of  examples of  the latter. The job of  civil society thus, among 
others, is to maintain equilibrium and stability between state and society in 
order that both state and society do not fall into these “extremist poles.” 
This is to say that the implementation of  “civic democratic ideals” needs 
the collaboration and synergy between state and society. 
Last but not least, the Philippine and Indonesian case described in 
the previous paragraphs clearly shows the religious vigor as among the 
contributing factors for global politics and public cultures. The pivotal 
role of  the world religions in the public domains of  the Philippines 
and Indonesia is not a new phenomenon. While in the Philippines, 
Catholicism began to emerge as a driving force for mass mobilization 
since 1950s, Indonesia’s Islamic reforms that later contributed to the 
shape of  “public Islam” and “political Islam” arouse since the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Till these days, Indonesia has been 
a cultural and political arena of  debate and struggle between religious 
factions and Muslim groupings, indicating the vitality of  religion. Such 
religious influence on political and public affairs is certainly not the unique 
case of  these two archipelagic states. As Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, 
and Timothy Shah have pointed out in their 2011 fine work, God’s‍Century:‍
Resurgent‍Religion‍and‍Global‍Politics, similar cases can be found elsewhere 
on this planet. This is to say that, in the modern era, instead of  dying, 
as secularisation theorists had mistakenly argued, religion has thrived. 
60 Robert W. Hefner, “On the History and Cross-Cultural Possibility”, p. 39.
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